I truly wish I didn’t feel compelled to probe George W. Bush’s motivations for wanting to initiate military action against Saddam Hussein.

But today, the links of the proposed course of action to our own security are not quite as clear as they were in going after al Qaeda in Afghanistan. While I’m inclined to shudder at the thought of a Saddam Hussein armed with nukes, nothing I’ve read establishes him as a supplier of either nuclear or biological weapons to al Qaeda or other anti-American terrorist groups.

Would Hussein go so far as to actually attack the United States with a nuclear bomb? Considering our unquestioned ability to reduce him and his entire country to little more than glowing sand, it seems pertinent to note that while the man may be a monster, he is not usually considered a fool.

The more likely effects of Hussein’s development of weapons of mass destruction would be in the Middle East, where they would threaten our allies and our interests, rather than our own immediate physical security.

The potential menace to Israel appears foremost in this area. But even this threat is probably not as black-and-white as it might initially appear. Israel, after all, has enough nuclear capability of its own to ensure that any attack by Iraq would end up being ultimately another form of suicide bombing, only on a broader scale.   The more likely effect of Iraq acquiring nuclear weapons seems to be more subtle and complex—e.g., a way of canceling out Israeli’s nuclear trump card, rather than something to be immediately deployed in a direct, offensive way.

If we’re going to undertake military action primarily to support the Israelis, we need to acknowledge that there is such a thing as going too far in our support of them. For example, I think we should be doing a good deal more to persuade the Israelis to abandon their West Bank settlements, along with their demeaning accoutrements of checkpoints and settlers-only roads, and accept the fact that the Palestinians aren’t going to give up their struggle until they get something more than a set of disconnected little Bantustans. We should make sure we can differentiate between what’s genuinely necessary for Israel’s security, and what merely contributes to its preponderance of power in the region—which may tend to encourage the Israelis to throw their weight around without proper regard for the inflammatory effects. 

Oil issues are another huge (and largely undiscussed) area of geopolitical consideration. Exactly how do these factor into the Bush administration’s current thinking? For example, how much of our proposed strategy is ultimately designed to safeguard the continued viability of the Saudi monarchy, our accustomed anchor of stability in the world’s petroleum markets?  Granted, fossil fuel availability isn’t the kind of issue that can whip up a storm of emotional support in a democracy such as ours. And given Bush’s personal closeness to the oil industry, the issue may be additionally ticklish for him to address. But if he continues to skirt it, the resulting doubts may be more damaging than if he addressed these matters head-on.

All in all, when I start to seriously scrutinize Bush’s motives, about the most favorable speculation I can come up with is that maybe he’s simply looking to capitalize on the groundswell of anti-terrorist feeling in America to remove what his administration perceives as a more complex threat to our allies, our interests, and the balance of power in the Middle East. If this is the case, I’d strongly prefer to have the issues discussed more openly.

Absent that kind of discussion, speculations have a way of drifting toward the less favorable end of the spectrum.

Who knows, for example, what kinds of personal issues rooted in his father’s earlier history with Saddam Hussein may be impelling George W. Bush in the current confrontation?

Likewise, who knows to what degree Bush may be confusing his own personal interests, and those of the Texas oil set he associates with, with those of the country at large?   This is, after all, a man who has historically displayed a great deal of difficulty with certain types of boundaries and clarity--ceaselessly lambasting government and presenting himself as an outsider, for example, when in fact, virtually all of his own personal wealth and prominence are rooted in his lifelong associations with government.

Finally, on a more straightforward subject, who knows how much Bush is simply looking to rally the electorate around a wartime commander-in-chief and his party, in the crucial upcoming November elections?